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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM

held,' 2 an agreement for appraisal is not the same as an agreement for arbitration,
and the courts cannot order the parties to comply with such an agreement. 13
The insured must present his case in an action at law; the 1941 amendment
to §144814 did not make the section applicable to appraisal agreements; these can
be enforced only by preventing the insured from bringing an action on the policy
if they are not complied with. The amendment of 1952'" is inapplicable; neither in
this amendment nor in that of 1941 is there exhibited any legislative intent to
change this rule.
Policy -Interpretation
In Harrisv. Allstate Ins. Co.16 the Court decided that an automobile insurance
policy which covered loss caused by water but excluded loss resulting from collision
did not cover damage caused by a pool of water which pulled an automobile from
its course. The policy stated that "loss caused by... water, flood... shall not be
deemed loss caused by collision or upset." However, the Court considered that
there was a considerable reduction in the premium rate because of the
non-coverage of loss due to collision, and that the parties could not reasonably
have expected coverage of a collision with water. 17 The majority claimed that,
according to the principle of noscitur a socis, the word "water" must be read in
the light of the other words in that same grouping, viz., "missiles, falling objects,
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, vandalism, riot or civil
commotion,' which are said to be causes included in policy coverage. All these
"causes" are active agents which cause damage by falling against the object
damaged. In this case, the car's collision with the water caused the damage; i.e., it
was not the water's peculiar properties that caused the damage. It is true that
water was one of the exceptions to things excluded from coverage but, even
though a policy must be interpreted most strongly against the insurer where there
12. 309 N. Y. 60, 127 N. E. 2d 808 (1955).
13. In Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N. Y. 403, 194 N. E.
2d 73 (1950), the Court of Appeals held the section is not so applicable.
14. This says that an arbitration contract "may include questions arising
out of.. . appraisals... collateral ... to any issue between the parties.'
15. Which included "...
appraisals . . . independent of any issue between

the parties."
16. 309 N. Y. 72, 127 N. E. 2d 816 (1955).
17. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86 (1918),
where, concerning a fire insurance policy, it was held that fire under freight cars,
which caused an explosion which caused a concussion of the air which damaged
the insured vessel, was not the proximate cause of the damage and not what was
contemplated by the parties as within the coverage. Judge Cardozo said: "Our
guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man
when making an ordinary business contract."
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are two possible constructions,' 8 "resort to a literal construction may not be had
when the result would be to thwart the obvious and dearly expressed purpose
which the parties intended to accomplish, or where such a construction would lead
to an obvious absurdity."'1
The dissenters claimed that the "plain meaning" of the contract was that
just such an occurrence as this was covered; water was one of the specific
exceptions to what was excluded from coverage. They believed the court was now
rewriting the contract for the parties according to what the parties intended. The
majority decided in part on the assumption that the court must interpret the
contract, where there is an ambiguity, as a reasonable business man would. The
dissent contended that there was no ambiguity.

MISCELLANEOUS
Suit on Payment Bonds
In McGrath v. American Surety Co., 1 plaintiff, a supplier of labor to a subcontractor, sued to recover, on a payment bond given by the latter to indemnify the
general contractor against liability to the subcontractor's suppliers of labor and
materials under the Miller Act.2 The Miller Act imposed upon the general contractor an obligation to furnish the Federal Government with both performance
and payment bonds in public works projects. Parties such as the plaintiff, who have
no contractual relation with the general contractor but have with a subcontractor,
are given an action on the payment bond. The defendant is a surety on a common
law bond given by the subcontractor. Whether plaintiff has a cause of action on
this common law bond or whether his sole remedy would be under the Miller Act
was the issue; the Court held, plaintiff had no cause of action. "The rights o f these
laborers and materialmen of the subcontractor were definitely fixed and considered to be protected adequately by the Miller Act. The object in giving the
bond in suit was to protect the contractor against this very liability imposed upon
him by Federal Law."3
18. HartoZ Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 290 N. Y. 44,
47 N. E. 2d 687 (1943). The dissent cites Mutchnick v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 157 Misc. 598, 284 N. Y. Supp. 565, (1935), for the proposition that
whether the results to the insured are harsh or beneficial there is no warrant for
interpreting the deliberate language of the policy in other than Its natural
meaning.
19. McGrail v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 292 N. Y. 419, 55 N. E. E,
2d 483 (1944).
1. 307 N. Y. 552, 122 N. E. 2d 906 (1954).
2. 40 U. S. C. 270-a, 270-b.
3. 308 N. Y. 464, 126 N. E. 2d 750 (1955).

